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Private set intersection (PSI) is a fundamental cryptographic protocol which has a wide range of applications. 
It enables two clients to compute the intersection of their private datasets without revealing non-matching 
elements. The advent of cloud computing drives the ambition to reduce computation and data management 
overhead by outsourcing such computations. However, since the cloud is not trustworthy, some cryptographic 
methods should be applied to maintain the confidentiality of datasets. But, in doing so, data owners may be 
excluded from access control on their outsourced datasets. Therefore, to control access rights and to interact 
with authorized users, they have to be online during the protocol. On the other hand, none of the existing 
cloud-based PSI schemes support fine-grained access control over outsourced datasets. This paper, for the first 
time, proposes an attribute-based private set intersection (AB-PSI) scheme providing fine-grained access 
control. AB-PSI allows a data owner to control intersection computations on its outsourced dataset by 
defining an access control policy. We also provide security definitions for an AB-PSI scheme and prove the 
security of our scheme in the standard model. We implement our scheme and report performance evaluation 
results. 
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1. Introduction 
Using cloud computing [20], [27], [29], clients with limited computational and storage resources can 
outsource their personal data to a cloud service provider and, at a later time, ask it to perform computations on 
their data. This type of computing and storage paradigm enables users to obtain and release computing and 
storage resources rapidly. Thus, one can access such various and convenient resources on demand. 
A private set intersection (PSI) scheme [12], [13], [34], [41] enables two clients to compute the intersection of 
their datasets, without revealing any information about the non-matched items. PSI has many real-world 
applications such as botnet detection [30], fully-sequenced human genome testing [7], privacy-preserving data 
mining [2], discovery of common friends [31], proximity testing [32], and user matching [17], etc. 
Considering the advantages of cloud computing, one realizes that it is worthwhile to use its capabilities to 
improve the qualities of PSI protocols. In this regard, several cloud-based PSI protocols are given in some 
recent works [1], [21], [22], [23], [25], [35], [42].  
In these works, clients outsource their datasets on a cloud service provider to benefit from its storage and computing ser-
vices. Since the cloud is considered as a semi-trusted entity, to provide confidentiality, some cryptographic operations are
performed on the datasets before outsourcing them. But, the cryptographic operations may cause a great challenge for data
owners to control the access rights to their outsourced datasets. In this case, data owners have to be online to manage their
data and to interact with authorized users in PSI computations, see Fig. 1(a). To the best of our knowledge, none of the exist-
ing works provide fine-grained access control over the outsourced encrypted data. Indeed, in these schemes, a data owner
cannot determine the authorized users for PSI computation by defining an access control policy.
In the following, we present two application scenarios in which clients require to have access control on their outsourced
data in PSI computation.
1.1. Motivation scenarios
1.1.1. Document similarity
Several editors of some scientific journals and conferences want to verify that none of the received manuscripts is under
review in another journal or conference. To ease the accessibility of the documents, the editors outsource their received
manuscripts to a cloud service provider. As the chairs are not allowed to share the received manuscripts, they encrypt their
data before outsourcing them. They need a mechanism to approximate the similarities in a privacy-preserving way. In [10],
PSI protocol is used to solve this problem. However, without access control on the data, the chairs have to be online to run PSI
protocol with the other chairs which may be time-consuming and increase their administrative costs, see Fig. 1(a). While, if a
PSI scheme providing fine-grained access control is used, then each chair can determine the desired user to compute the sim-
ilarities of their manuscripts with his/her documents, by defining an access policy, and as long as he/she wants, he/she can be
offline, see Fig. 1(b).
1.1.2. Search of similar patients in genomic data
The rapid development of genomic data affords a lot of new ways to improve medicine and research. However, it comes
with burdens since it may cause some issues more noteworthy than its advantages. A genome can uniquely specify its owner
and contains a lot of individual and sensitive information. The availability of genomic data provides several new ways to
improve medicine and research. For example, a doctor holding the genome of his/her patient may interact with the other
doctors around the world to find some individuals with similar genomic data and uses the individuals’ data to diagnose
and to find the effective treatment according to the patient?s conditions [5,40]. However, because of the privacy exposure
implications, the genomic data must not be announced to the other doctors. By using a PSI protocol, doctors can find similar
genomic data [3,40]. On the other hand, if they want to share their data via a cloud, they must encrypt their data before out-
sourcing them. But, the encryption operation may exclude them from controlling access rights on their data. Therefore, they
may have to spend a lot of time to run the PSI protocols with the other doctors.
1.2. Technical roadmap
To address the mentioned problems, we introduce a cloud-based cryptographic primitive called attribute-based private set
intersection (AB-PSI ). Our scheme offers data confidentiality and fine-grained access control. In our scheme, by defining an
access control policy, a data owner can control PSI computation on its dataset. Only data users whose attributes satisfy the
access control policy can ask for intersection computation. Also, the cloud service provider cannot learn any information
about the protocol results and contents of the datasets. Moreover, in our AB-PSI, the intersection computation does not need
the cooperation of data owners, and they can be offline after outsourcing their datasets, see Fig. 1(b).
1.3. Contributions
The main contributions of this paper can be summarized as follows:
Fig. 1. (a) Dataset matching without fine-grained access control; (b) Dataset matching with fine-grained access control.
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1. Fine-grained access control: We propose the first fine-grained access control system for private set intersection compu-
tation in cloud computing, called AB-PSI. In this system, a data owner can control the intersection computation on its out-
sourced dataset by defining an access control policy.
2. Non-interactive PSI computation: In the existing scheme, if one of the clients cannot interact with the other client, the
PSI computation cannot be performed. Indeed, both clients must be online and interact with each other. It may not be
desirable and may rise the administrative costs. In contrast with existing works, in our scheme, data owners can be offline
after outsourcing their datasets, and the intersection computation can be done without their participation, see Fig. 1.
3. One-to-many communication: Our proposed system supports one-to-many communication; this means that an out-
sourced encrypted dataset can be used in an arbitrary number of PSI computations, such that no re-preparation on the
encrypted data is required.
4. Providing security definitions: We provide formal security definitions for an AB-PSI scheme according to security aims
in ABE schemes and PSI protocols. Also, two security definitions called adaptively secure against chosen dataset attack and
data secrecy are defined. The first one is to capture that the cloud service provider and unauthorized data user colluding
with each other are unable to learn any partial information about the contents of the outsourced datasets. The second one
says that for a data owner with dataset X outsourced to the cloud and an authorized data user with dataset Y, the data
user only can learn X \ Y and nothing else.
5. Security and performance analysis: According to the security definition, we formally prove that AB-PSI is secure in the
standard model, under standard hardness assumptions. Also, we implement AB-PSI and evaluate the execution-time,
storage cost, and communication overhead on the entities of the system.
1.4. Organization
The remaining of this paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, we introduce the related works on ABE schemes and PSI
protocols. We give the preliminaries in Section 3. In Section 4, we provide the system model, threat model, and system and
security definitions. The detailed construction is given in Section 5. In Sections 6 and 7, we analyze our proposed AB-PSI in
terms of security and performance, respectively. Finally, we conclude this work in Section 8. The Appendix describes detailed
correctness proof of AB-PSI system.
2. Related work
In this section, we review relevant prior works falling into two categories: (1) ABE schemes, and (2) PSI protocols.
2.1. ABE schemes
The concept of identity-based encryption (IBE) was initially put forth by Shamir [37] to reduce key and certificate man-
agement costs. In an IBE scheme, since the identity of users (such as their phone numbers or email addresses) are their
public-keys, there is no need to verify the validity of the public-keys and certificates. The idea of IBE schemes inspired Sahai
and Waters to design attribute-based encryption schemes [36] by replacing identity in IBE schemes with an attribute set. In
an ABE scheme, a transmitter can specify authorized receivers by determining an attribute set and a threshold value. Users
who the number of their common attributes with the specified attribute set is equal or more than the threshold value can
recover the message. Subsequently, Goyal et al. improve the capability of ABE schemes by proposing the notion of key-policy
ABE (KP-ABE) [18]. In a KP-ABE any ciphertext is labeled by an attribute set, and users’ secret-keys are associated with an
access control policy defined by the key-generator authority. A user’s secret key is able to decrypt a ciphertext if and only
if the attributes of the ciphertext satisfy the access control policy associated with the secret-key. In a KP-ABE scheme, access
rights of data users are specified by the key generator authority. This feature may reduce control of data owners on their
data. To address this problem, Bethencourt et al. proposed the concept of ciphertext-policy ABE (CP-ABE) scheme [9]. In a
CP-ABE scheme, data users’ secret-keys are associated with their attributes, and each ciphertext is associated with an access
control policy defined by the transmitter. Secret-key of a data user can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if the data user’s attri-
butes satisfy the access control policy associated with the ciphertext. It seems that the features of CP-ABE schemes are more
compatible with our design goals. So, we apply these schemes to this paper.
To realize fine-grained access control over outsourced encrypted data, attribute-based systems are used in a wide range of
cryptographic schemes such as encryption schemes [4,29], searchable encryption schemes [27,28], signature schemes [11],
signcryption schemes [8], authentication schemes [26], proxy re-encryption schemes [19], and broadcast encryption
schemes [43]. However, to the best of our knowledge, the capabilities of attribute-based schemes in providing fine-
grained access control have not been used in the could-based PSI schemes yet. Furthermore, there is no PSI scheme providing
fine-grained access control.
2.2. PSI protocol
Private set intersection (PSI) was initially proposed by Freedman et al. [16]. Subsequently, some PSI protocols were intro-
duced in [6,12–15,24,33]. In [24], several methods for computing union, intersection, and element reduction operations, in a
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privacy-preserving way, was proposed. In [6,12–15] several PSI protocols with linear computation and communication com-
plexities were designed. Among them, [15] provides a scalable, efficient PSI protocol based on oblivious Bloom intersection,
and [6,14] afford PSI protocol hiding dataset sizes from the other entities. Later on, using permutation-based hashing, the
scheme presented in [15] was improved in [33]. Nonetheless, in all the mentioned PSI protocols, clients jointly compute
the intersections, and therefore, they have to be online when the protocol is run. In principle, it seems that these PSI proto-
cols are not fit to realize security and privacy in outsourcing data and computations to a third party.
In [1,21–23,25,35,42], several PSI protocols enabling users to outsource data and computations to a third party (e.g., cloud
computing) have been introduced. However, none of these works provides fine-grained access control over outsourced data,
and clients have to interact with each other online, two by two, in PSI computations. Moreover, in schemes [21–23,25,35,42],
the outsourced encrypted dataset to the cloud for PSI computing is disposable. This means that, if Alice has run the PSI pro-
tocol with Bob, then she has to re-prepare her dataset for running the protocol with Charlie. Also, In [25,35,42] the cloud
service provider is able to understand whether the intersection of two datasets is empty or not. This is in contrast with
one of the most basic security requirements in PSI protocols [6,12,13,24]. Moreover, the schemes [1,21,25] are secure only
if the cloud service provider does not collude with the other parties. Indeed, in their scheme, an unauthorized data user can
compute the intersection of its dataset with any data owner if he colludes with the cloud service provider. A comparison
between AB-PSI and some existing cloud-based PSI protocol is given in Section 7. Table 4 summarizes characteristics com-
parison between our proposed scheme and some current cloud-based PSI schemes.
3. Preliminaries
Let e S denote the random selection of an element e from a set S. In the following, we briefly introduce some funda-
mental concepts and assumptions needed for presenting our work.
3.1. Cryptographic structures and assumptions
Bilinear map: Let G1 and G2 be two cyclic groups of a prime order q. A function ê : G1  G1 ! G2 satisfying the following
properties is said to be a bilinear map:
 Bilinearity: For any two elements a; b 2 Zq and g 2 G1, we get ê ga; gb
 
¼ ê gb; ga
 
¼ ê g; gð Þab.
 Non-degeneracy: There exists an element g 2 G1 that ê g; gð Þ–1.
 Computability: There exists an efficient algorithm to compute ê g;hð Þ, for any g; h 2 G1.
Consider a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) algorithm G that n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
, where n is the security parameter of
the system, and q;G1;G2 and ê are the same as above. In this paper, we consider the following cryptographic assumptions on
G:
Discrete Logarithm Assumption (DL): Given n; q; g; ga;G1;G2; êð Þ, where n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
; g  G1, and a Zq, this
assumption says that any PPT adversary A can compute a with a negligible advantage in the security parameter n. In other
words, for any PPT adversary A, there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr A n; q; g; ga;G1;G2; êð Þ ¼ að Þ 6 negl nð Þ; ð1Þ
where the probability is taken over n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
; g  G1;a Zq, and the randomness used by A.
Decisional Bilinear Diffie Hellman Assumption (DBDH): Given n; q; g; ga; gb; gc; gz;G1;G2; êð Þ, where n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  
G 1n
 
; g  G1;a; b; c Zq , and z either is equal to abc or z Zq, this assumption says that the advantage of any PPT adver-
sary in determining the case of z is negligible in the security parameter n. In other words, for any PPT adversary A, there
exists a negligible function negl such that:








j 6 negl nð Þ; ð2Þ
where the probabilities are taken over n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
;a; b; c; z Zq, and the randomness of A.
3.2. Access trees
Access trees are convenient to represent access control policies [18]. In an access tree, any leaf node is associated with an
attribute, and each inner node represents a threshold value. The threshold value of each leaf node is assumed to be 1. Con-
sider an access tree T . Let va denote the leaf node associated with the attribute a; kv denote the threshold value of a node
v ; chv denote the childeren set of a node v;RT denote the root node of T ; LT denote the leaf node set of the access tree T , and
T v denote a subtree of T rooted at a node v.
Let U be the universal attribute set. For an access tree T and a node v of the tree, consider a function FT v : 2
U ! 0;1f g,
where for an attribute set Att the evaluation of FT v Attð Þ is performed as follows:
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 When v is a leaf node corresponding to an attribute a; FT v Attð Þ ¼ 1 if and only if a 2 Att.
 When v is an inner node with threshold value kv ; FT v Attð Þ ¼ 1 if and only if there exist at least kv children c1; . . . ; ckv of v
that FT ci Attð Þ ¼ 1, for i ¼ 1; . . . kv .
We say that an attribute set Att satisfies an access tree T and denote it by FT Attð Þ ¼ 1 if FT RT Attð Þ ¼ 1. Also, we use
FT Attð Þ ¼ 0 to indicate that Att does not satisfy T .
Consider a prime number q, an access tree T , and a secret r 2 Zq. We denote an algorithm for sharing the secret r accord-
ing to T and q as:
qv 0ð Þf gv2LT  Share T ; q; rð Þ: ð3Þ
For any node v in T , this algorithm assigns a kv  1ð Þ-degree polynomial with coefficients in Zq to v in a top-down style as
follows:
 It assigns a kRT  1
 
-degree polynomial qRT to the root node RT such that qRT 0ð Þ ¼ r, and the rest of its coefficients are
chosen randomly from Zq.
 For any node vwith polynomial qv and children set chv ¼ c1; . . . cjchv j
 
, it generates a kci  1
 
-degree polynomial qci for ci
such that qci 0ð Þ ¼ qv ið Þ, and the rest of its coefficients are chosen randomly from Zq, for any i ¼ 1; . . . ; jchv j.
When this algorithm stops, it associates a value qv 0ð Þ to each v 2 LT .
Given n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
, a secret r 2 Zq, an access tree T , an attribute set S which its elements are associated with




, we denote the
algorithm for recovering ê g1; g2ð Þ
r through the value set as:
ê g1; g2ð Þ






It executes the following steps in a bottom-top fashion according to the access tree T as follows:
 If Att does not satisfies T , then this algorithm aborts.
 Otherwise, it executes the following steps:
– [–] It assigns the value ê g1; g2ð Þ
qva 0ð Þ to the leaf node va.
– [–] For any inner node v, if there exist kv children cij getting a value ê g1; g2ð Þ
qcij
0ð Þ
; j ¼ 1; . . . ; kv , then it computes:
Ykv
j¼1









¼ ê g1; g2ð Þ







. (Note that, from the basic fact about polynomial interpolation technique, we havePkv
j¼1lij qcij
xð Þ ¼ qv xð Þ, for any x 2 Zq). Then, it assigns ê g1; g2ð Þ
qv 0ð Þ to v.
If T is satisfied by Att, then this algorithm returns ê g1; g2ð Þ
r .
4. Problem formulation
In this section, we first introduce the systemmodel and threat model. Then, we define our proposed AB-PSI system and its
security model.
4.1. System model
Given a cryptographic cloud storage system which supports both PSI computation and fine-grained access control, in this
paper, we consider a system consists of a Central Authority (CA), a Cloud Service Provider (CSP), and several Data Owners and
Data Users, see Fig. 2. The tasks of the mentioned entities are described in more details below:
1. CA: It initializes the public parameters of the system, and it is responsible for delegating the data users’ secret-keys,
according to their attributes.
2. Data owners: To prevent illegal access to its data, each data owner defines an access control policy on its dataset; it blinds
the dataset under the access policy by using the public-parameters of the system, and it outsources the blinded datasets
to the cloud.
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3. Data users: A data user whose attributes satisfy an access control policy defined by a data owner can request the CSP to
generate the required token for PSI computation. Using the obtain token, the data user can compute the intersection
between its dataset and the data owner’s dataset.
4. CSP: The CSP provides storage, fine-grained access control, and PSI computation services for data owners and data users
of the system.
In our proposed AB-PSI scheme, the intersection of two datasets is computed according to the following three rules:
 The access policy of the outsourced blinded dataset must be satisfied by the data user’s attributes.
 Authorized data users learn the intersection of two datasets and nothing else.
 The CSP learns nothing about the contents of the two datasets, and it does not learn any information about the result of
the PSI protocol. Indeed, the CSP cannot understand whether the intersection of two datasets is empty or not.
4.2. Threat model
Let X and Y be a data owner’s dataset and a data user’s dataset, respectively. In this work, the CSP is a semi-trusted entity
[27,29,38]. It executes the given protocols correctly. But, it may try to derive some sensitive valuable information through
collusion with some unauthorized data users or statistical analysis of the outsourced data. Unauthorized data users are
assumed to be malicious. They may collude with each other and the CSP to get information about the outsourced datasets.
But, authorized data users are semi-trusted. They do not collude with the other parties and do not reveal the contents of
X \ Y and Y. But, they are always curious to obtain elements of X n Y . The CA is assumed to be trusted. It assigns secret-
keys of data users according to their attributes and does not give illegal access rights to them, at all. Also, it never colludes
with the other parties. Data owners are assumed to be trusted. They never reveal the elements of their privet datasets. Table 1
summarizes the threat model of our proposed system.
4.3. Overview of our proposed AB-PSI
Our proposed scheme consists of the following six algorithms shown in Fig. 3 divided into four phases: System setup,
User registration and Key delegation, Dataset blinding, and PSI computation. In the following, based on the introduced
system model, we define our proposed scheme. The notations used in system definition and the construction presented in
Section 5 are listed in Table 2.
Definition 1. An attribute-based privet set intersection (AB-PSI) scheme is a tuple of six PPT algorithms
P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind; TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ defined as follows:
Fig. 2. Basic AB-PSI system model.
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Table 1
The treat model summery.
Entity Type Colludes with Goals in its attack
CSP Semi-trusted Unauthorized data users Learning the contents of X and the results of the protocol
Authorized data users Semi-trusted No one Learning the contents of X=Y
Unauthorized data users Malicious CSP and data users Learning the contents of X
CA Trusted – –
Data owners Trusted – –




U The universal attribute set
n Security parameter of the system
PK Public parameters of the system
MSK Master secret-key of the system
u A data user
idu Identifier of the data user u
Att Attribute set of a data user
SK uð ÞAtt
Secret-key of a data user u corresponding to an attribute set Att
T An access tree
X ¼ xif gi2I A data owner’s dataset, where I is a finite index set
Y ¼ yif gj2J A data user’s dataset, where J is a finite index set
BDTX Blinded dataset corresponding to a dataset X and an access tree T
TK uð ÞAtt
PSI token generated by TokenGen1 algorithm
d A private-key generated by TokenGen1 algorithm
TK uð ÞX PSI tokens generated by TokenGen2 algorithm
A A probabilistic polynomial time adversary
AC DAA;P nð Þ Adaptively Chosen-Dataset Attack (AC-DA) indistinguishability experiment
PCA;P nð Þ Plaintext computing (PC) experiment
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1. PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
: The CA operates this algorithm. It takes a security parameter 1n and the universal attribute set
U as inputs and initializes the public parameters, PK, and the master secret-key, MSK, of the system.
2. SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ: The CA executes this algorithm. Inputs of the algorithm are public parameters and
maser secret-key of the system; an attribute set Att, and an identifier idu of a data user. It outputs a secret-key SK
uð Þ
Att cor-
responding to Att and idu.
3. BDTX  Blind PK; T ;Xð Þ: Data owners run this algorithm. It takes public parameters PK, an access tree T , and a dataset X as
inputs. The output of the algorithm is a blinded dataset BDTX corresponding to the dataset X and the access tree T .
4. TK uð ÞAtt ; d
 
 TokenGen1 PK; idu; SK uð ÞAtt
 
: This algorithm is run by a data user of the system. It takes public parameters of
the system, and secret-key and identifier of the data user running this algorithm. It returns the corresponding PSI token
TK uð ÞAtt and its associated private-key d.






: The CSP executes this algorithm. Taking public parameters PK, a PSI token TK uð ÞAtt , and
a blinded dataset BDTX , this algorithm returns the corresponding PSI token TK
uð Þ
X or an error message ?.
6. X \ Y  PSI PK; TK uð ÞX ;Y; d
 
: By using this algorithm, a data user with a dataset Y can compute the intersection of its
dataset with a data owner’s dataset. On inputs public parameters PK, a valid PSI token TK uð ÞX , a dataset Y, and a private-
key d, this algorithm outputs X \ Y .
Definition 2. An AB-PSI system is said to be correct if for any two given datasets X and Y ; PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
, access
tree T satisfied by an attribute set Att, secret-key SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Attð , iduÞ, blinded dataset BD
T
X  Blind PK; T ;Xð Þ,











PSI PK; TK uð ÞX ;Y ;d
 
¼ X \ Y: ð6Þ
4.4. Security models
AB-PSI security requires that the CSP does not learn any information about the protocol results and contents of the out-
sourced datasets, the PSI computation is not possible for unauthorized data users, and any authorized data user only can
learn the intersection of the two datasets and nothing else. More precisely, an AB-PSI scheme should satisfy the following
security requirements:
1. Adaptively secure against chosen dataset attack: This requirement is to capture any PPT adversary A modeling the
semi-trusted CSP colluding with unauthorized data users is unable to deduce any partial information about the contents
of a data owner’s dataset from the corresponding blinded datasets and an arbitrary number of unmatched secret-keys and
matched PSI tokens. Equivalently, any adversary allowing to adaptively ask for unauthorized data users’ secret-keys and
matched PSI tokens cannot distinguish between two challenge blinded datasets BDTX 0ð Þ and BD
T
X 1ð Þ , for any two datasets
X 0ð Þ ¼ x 0ð Þi
n o
i2I
and X 1ð Þ ¼ x 1ð Þi
n o
i2I
, where jx 0ð Þi j ¼ jx
1ð Þ
i j for any i 2 I.
2. Data secrecy: This requirement says that for any blinded dataset BDTX corresponding to X ¼ xif gi2I and any adversary A
modeling an authorized data user, if xi0 is unknown to A, for an i0 2 I, then the advantage of A in learning xi0 from the
blinded dataset as well as an arbitrary number of match secret-keys and PSI tokens is no more than that of one random
element guess. Consequently, under this requirement, for an outsourced blinded dataset BDTX and a dataset Y belonging to
an authorized data user, the data user only can learn X \ Y and nothing else about X n Y .
In the following, we formalize the described security requirement in terms of the following two games:
4.4.1. Adaptively secure against chosen dataset attack
Let P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ be an AB-PSI scheme, and A be a PPT adversary. Consider
the following experiment:
Adaptively Chosen-Dataset Attack (AC-DA) indistifnguishability experiment AC DAA;P nð Þ:
1. Setup: The challenger selects a security parameter n and a universal attribute set U and runs PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
.
It gives PK to the adversary A.
2. Phase 1:Amakes a polynomial number of queries to the following oracles, and the challenger keeps a list of attribute sets
L uð ÞATT , for any data user u, which is initially empty:
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 OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ: The challenger runs SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ and returns the requested secret-key to A. It
also adds Att to L uð ÞATT .




: The challenger, at first, runs SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ and then using the
obtained secret-key runs TK uð ÞAtt ; d
 
 TokenGen1 PK; idu; SK uð ÞAtt
 
. It gives TK uð ÞAtt to the adversary A.
3. Challenge: Adversary A selects an access tree T , a finite index set I, and two datasets X0 ¼ x 0ð Þi
n o
i2I




 For any data user u and Att 2 L uð ÞATT ; FT  Attð Þ ¼ 0.
 jx 0ð Þi j ¼ jx
1ð Þ
i j, for any i 2 I.
 For any t 2 0;1f g and i; k 2 I; x tð Þi –x
tð Þ
k .
Then, the challenger selects b 0;1f g and runs BDT

Xb
 Blind PK; T ;Xbð Þ. BDT

Xb
is returned to A.




as in Phase 1. The only
restriction is that Att; iduð Þ cannot be the input of OKeyGen if FT  Attð Þ ¼ 1.
5. Guess: A outputs a bit b0 2 0;1f g.
The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if b0 ¼ b, and 0 otherwise. We write AC DAA;P nð Þ ¼ 1 if the output is 1. In
this case, we say that the adversary A succeeds.
Definition 3. An AB-PSI scheme P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind; TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ is adaptively secure against
chosen-dataset attack if for every PPT adversary A, there is a negligible function negl such that:
Pr AC DAA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ 6
1
2
þ negl nð Þ: ð7Þ
4.4.2. Data secrecy
For a PPT adversary A and an AB-PSI construction P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ, consider the
following experiment:
Plaintext computing (PC) experiment PCA;P nð Þ:
1. Setup: The challenger chooses a security parameter n and the universal attribute set U. Then, it runs
PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
and returns PK to the adversary A.
2. Phase 1: Amakes a polynomial number of queries to the oracle OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ. When the challenger receives a request,
it runs SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ and gives SK
uð Þ
Att to A.
3. Challenge: Adversary A returns a non-trivial access policy T  to the challenger. The challenger selects a dataset
X ¼ xi
 
i2I , where x

i  Zq, for any i 2 I
. Then, it runs BDT

x
if gi2I  Blind PK; T
;Xð Þ and gives the generated blinded
dataset to the adversary.
4. Phase 2: A makes more queries to the oracle OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ, without any restriction.
5. Guess: A outputs a plaintext x.
The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if x 2 xi
 
i2I , and 0 otherwise. We write PCA;P ¼ 1 when the output of the
experiment is 1, and in this case we say the adversary succeeds.
Definition 4. An AB-PSI scheme P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ achieves data secrecy if for every
PPT adversary A there exists a negligible function negl such that:
Pr PCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ 6 negl nð Þ: ð8Þ
As will be shown in Theorems 2 and 3, under the DBDH and DL assumptions described in SubSection 3.1, our proposed
scheme is secure against adaptively chosen-dataset attack, and it achieves data secrecy.
5. Our proposed scheme
In this section, we present the concrete construction of the basic AB-PSI scheme providing fine-grained access PSI com-
putation. Then, we show that our proposed scheme is correct according to Definition 1. The notations used in our scheme are
presented in Table 2.
5.1. Concrete construction of AB-PSI
Our proposed construction consists of the following four phases:
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5.1.1. System Setup
To initialize public parameters and master secret-keys of the system, the CA considers a universal attribute set U and
selects a security parameter n. Then, it executes Setup algorithm as follows, see Fig. 4.
Setup 1n;U
 
: On input a security parameter 1n and the universal attribute set U, this algorithm runs
n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
. Then, it selects g0; g1; g2; g3  G1, x0; x1  Zq, and a collision-resistant hash function
H : G2 ! 0;1f gm, wherem is a positive integer. Afterwards, for any attribute a 2 U, it selects ska  Zq. This algorithm returns
the public parameters
PK ¼ n;G1;G2;H; ê;g0;g1;g2;h0 ¼ g
x0
0 ;h1 ¼ g
x1
0 ;h2 ¼ g3h
x0










MSK ¼ x0; x1; g3; skaf ga2U
 
:
5.1.2. User registration and key delegation
When a data user uwith an attribute set Att joins to the system, it first registers and selects a unique identifier idu. Then, it
asks the CA to generate the secret-key corresponding to its attribute set. The CA runs KeyGen algorithm as follows and
returns the queried secret-key to the data user, see Fig. 5.
KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ: This algorithm generates secret-key of a data user with an identifier idu, and an attribute set
Att, as follows:









When a data owner wants to outsource a dataset X ¼ xif gi2I to the CSP, to provide data confidentiality and fine-grained
access control, it first defines an access control policy T and blinds X under T by using Blind algorithm as follows, see Fig. 6:




 Share T ; q; rð Þ. Then, it blinds X as follows:
BDTX ¼ T ;C1 ¼ gr2; C2 ¼ h
r





; C0va ¼ pkag12
 qva 0ð Þn o
va2LT







Fig. 4. System setup phase.
Fig. 5. User Registration and Key Delegation phase.
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5.1.4. PSI computation
When a data user wants to compute the intersection between its private dataset and a data owner’s dataset correspond-
ing to BDTX , at first, it runs TokenGen1 algorithm to generate a PSI token for the CSP. When the CSP receives a valid PSI token
from a data user, it runs TokenGen2 algorithm and gives the data owner the required token for the PSI computation. The data
user obtaining the PSI token can execute PSI algorithm and calculate the intersection of the two datasets, see Fig. 7. The men-
tioned three algorithms in this phase are defined as follows:




: On input an identifier and a data user’s secret-key, this algorithm chooses s; d Zq and
returns a PSI token:
TK uð ÞAtt ¼ tk1 ¼ gd0; tk2 ¼ h
d
1; tk3 ¼ id
d
u; tk4 ¼ gs0; tk5 ¼ h
sd











: Given a PSI token TK uð ÞAtt and a blinded dataset BD
T
X , this algorithm checks whether there is any
attribute set S 2 2Att satisfying T . If not, then this algorithm returns an error message ?. Otherwise, for any a 2 S, it
computes:
TKa;u;d ¼
ê Cva tk1 ;tka;uð Þ
ê Cva tk1 ;h2ð Þ:ê pkag12 ;tk3ð Þ:ê C0va ;iduð Þ:tk5
¼ ê h0; g1ð Þ
qva 0ð Þþd:h
qva 0ð Þþd
4 :ê g2; iduð Þ
qva 0ð Þþd:ê gs0; g2
 qva 0ð Þ: ð14Þ





TKr;u;d ¼ ê h0; g1ð Þ
rþd










0 ;tk2ð Þ:ê C1 ;idutk4ð Þ:ê g2 ;tk3ð Þ
¼ hrþd3 :
ð16Þ
Fig. 6. Dataset blinding phase.
Fig. 7. PSI computation phase.
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Finally, the algorithm outputs another PSI token:
TK uð Þxif gi2I ¼ TKr;d;C xif gi2I
 
: ð17Þ
PSI PK; TK uð ÞX ;Y; d
 
: To compute the intersection between a data owner’s dataset X ¼ xif gi2I corresponding to a PSI token
TK uð ÞX and a data user’s dataset Y ¼ yj
 













for any j 2 J. Then, it returns ykf gk2K #Y as the final output, where
K ¼ k 2 JjH hryk3
 









In the following, we show the correctness of the proposed scheme.
Theorem 1. If H is a collision resistant hash function, then AB-PSI scheme is correct.
Proof.
The detailed proof is given in Appendix. &
6. Security analysis
In this section, we show that AB-PSI scheme satisfies the security requirements mentioned in Section 5.
Theorem 2. If the DBDH problem is hard relative to G, then AB-PSI scheme is adaptively secure against chosen-dataset attack
in the standard model.
Proof.
LetP ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2ð , PSIÞ be our proposed AB-PSI scheme andA be a PPT adversary in
AC DAA;P nð Þ experiment introduced in SubSection 4.4.1. Consider another adversary A0 that aims to solve DBDH problem.
Given n; q;G1;G2; ê; g; gað , gb; gc; ê g; gð ÞzÞ, where n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
; g  G1;a; b; c Zq, and z ¼ abc or z Zq, the goal
of A0 is to determine the case of z. A0 tries to solve the problem by running A as a subroutine as follows:
1. Setup: A0 considers a universal attribute set U and a hash function H : G2 ! 0;1f gm. It also selects h2  G1; t1; t2  Zq,
and ska  Zq for any a 2 U. It gives










to the adversary A. Comparing Eqs. (20) and (9), one concludes that if the master secret-key x0 in (10) is equal to b, then
the system public parameters in (20) are selected correctly.






so by comparing (21) and (9) we see that h2 is chosen correctly.
2. Phase 1: A is allowed to make adaptive queries to the following oracles, for polynomially-many times, and adversary A0
holds a list L uð ÞATT , for each data user u, which is initially empty.
OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ: For any attribute a 2 Att;A0 sets
ska;u ¼ h2 gb
 t2 idskau ð22Þ
and returns SK uð ÞAtt ¼ ska;u
 
a2Att to the adversary A. It also adds Att to L
uð Þ
ATT .
OTokenGen1 Att; iduð Þ: At first, A0 executes OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ and generates SK
uð Þ
Att . Then, it selects d; s Zq and gives a PSI token
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TK uð ÞAtt ¼ tk1 ¼ gd0; tk2 ¼ h
d
1; tk3 ¼ id
d
u; tk4 ¼ gs0; tk5 ¼ h
sd





to the adversary A.
Note that, we have:
h2 gbð Þ



























So, the secret-key generated in (22) is valid.
3. Challenge: Adversary A returns an access tree T  and two datasets X0 ¼ x 0ð Þi
n o
i2I
;X1 ¼ x 1ð Þi
n o
i2I
to adversary A0, where I is






i0 , for any i; i0 2 I and t 2 0;1f g. A0 checks whether FT  Attð Þ ¼ 0 or not, for any
Att 2 L uð ÞATT and data user u. If not, A0 aborts. Otherwise, it selects b 0;1f g and defines:
QR : Zq ! G1




where qR xð Þ : Zq ! Zq is a random (kR  1)-degree polynomial that qR 0ð Þ ¼ 0, and kR is the threshold value of the root
node of T . Then, for any i-th child ci of the root node R, it defines the following function:
Qci : Zq ! G1
Qci xð Þ ¼ g
qR ið Þgqci xð Þ;
(
ð26Þ
where qci is a random (kci  1)-degree polynomial that qci 0ð Þ ¼ 0. This process is continued until a function
Qv : Zq ! G1




is assigned to any node v of T , where pv is the parent of v ; qv 0ð Þ ¼ 0, and qv ’s degree is equal to kv  1.
Since the threshold value of each leaf node in the access tree T  is equal to one, therefore the assigned functions to any
leaf node of the access tree is a constant function. So, for an unknown value qva 2 Zq, we have Qva ¼ gqva , where va is the
leaf node corresponding to the attribute a. It is not hard to see that qva
 
va2LT
is a valid output of Share T ; q; cð Þ algorithm.
So, if we assume that the random element r 2 Zq chosen in Blind algorithm described in SubSection (5.1) is equal to c,
then for any va 2 LT :



















 qva ¼20ð Þpkqvaa gqva2 ¼ pkag12 qva ð29Þ












to the adversary A, where
C1 ¼ gcð Þt1 ¼ gt1
 c ¼20ð Þ gc2; ð31Þ
C2 ¼ ê g; gð Þz:ê gb; gc
 s
; ð32Þ
ci ¼ H ê g; gð Þz
 x bð Þ
i
 	





and Cva and Cva 0 are the same as (28) and (29), respectively, for any va 2 LT .
Remark 1.
Note that if z ¼ abc, then
ê g; gð Þz:ê gb; gc
 t2 ¼ ê g; gð Þabc:ê g; gð Þt2bc ¼ ê g; gð Þb at2ð Þc ¼ ê gb; gat2 c ¼20ð Þ ê h10 ;h1 c; ð34Þ
and








¼ H ê ga; gb
 cx bð Þ
i
 	
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Assuming the uniform element r chosen in Blind PK; T ; xif gi2I
 
algorithm is equal to the unknown value c, from Eqs. (33)–
(35), one concludes that (30) is a valid blinded dataset corresponding to Xb.
4. Phase 2: The adversary A makes more queries to the oracles OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ and OTokenGen1 Att; iduð Þ as in Phase 1, with
the same restriction mentioned in SubSection 4.4.1.
5. Guess: Adversary A outputs a bit b0 2 0;1f g. Then, A0 checks whether b ¼ b0 or not. If so, it outputs 1, and 0 otherwise.
As we mentioned in Remark 1, if z ¼ abc, then the returned blinded dataset to the adversary A is valid. So, in this case,




¼ Pr AC DAA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ: ð36Þ
On the other hand, if z is a uniform element of Zq, then C2 in (31) is also a uniform element of G2. Therefore, it is independent
of Xb. In this case, the adversary A cannot learn any information about Xb. Equivalently,











Combining Eqs. (36) and (38), and the assumption that the DBDH problem is hard relative to G algorithm, one concludes that
there is a negligible function negl that:
jPr AC DAA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ  12 j ¼








j 6 negl nð Þ:
ð39Þ
Corollary 1. Our proposed scheme is resistant against collusion attack of unauthorized data users.
Proof. As we have seen in the proof of Theorem 2, any adversary A entitled to request all secret-keys of unauthorized data
users is unable to break the security of our scheme. So, any group of unauthorized data users cannot learn any partial infor-
mation about contents of data associated with a blinded dataset.
Theorem 3. If the DL problem is hard relative to G, then our proposed AB-PSI scheme gains data secrecy in the standard model.
Proof.
Let P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ be our AB-PSI scheme; A be the PPT adversary in PCA;P nð Þ
experiment, and A0 be another PPT adversary attempting to solve DL problem. Consider a challenger that runs
n; q;G1;G2; êð Þ  G 1n
 
and returns n; q;G1;G2; ê; g; gað Þ to adversary A0, where g  G1;a Zq, and n is the security
parameter of the system. The goal of A0 is to compute a. A0 runs A as a subroutine as follows:
1. Setup: The adversary A0 considers a universal attribute setU and selects a hash function H : G2 ! 0;1f gm, then it chooses
x0; x1  Zq; g1; g2; g3  G1, and for any a 2 U it selects ska  Zq. It returns the public parameters
PK ¼ n;G1;G2;H; ê; g0 ¼ g; g1; g2; h0 ¼ gx0 ;h1 ¼ gx1 ;h2 ¼ g3h
x0









it keeps the master secret-key MSK ¼ x0; x1; g3; skaf ga2U
 
to itself.
2. Phase 1: Adversary A makes adaptive queries to the oracle OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ for polynomially-many times. When A0
receives a request Att; iduð Þ, it runs SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ and gives SK
uð Þ
Att to A.











































are generated same as the Blind algorithm pre-






is a valid blinded dataset corresponding
to the access tree T  and dataset aX ¼ axi
 k
i¼1.
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4. Phase 2: Adversary A can make more queries to oracle OKeyGen Att; iduð Þ, and A0 answers them as in Phase 1.
5. Guess: Adversary A returns ~x 2 Zq to A0.
Adversary A0 selects x  x1; . . . ; xk
 
and outputs x1~x. Now, if the adversary A wins the PCA;P experiment, then
~x ¼ axi0 , for an i0 2 1; . . . ; kf g. So, the adversary A0 solves the DL problem if and only if x
 ¼ xi0 . Therefore,
Pr A0 n; q; g; ga;G1;G2; êð Þ ¼ að ÞP Pr x ¼ xi0
 
Pr PCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ
¼ 1k Pr PCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ:
ð42Þ
By the assumption that the DL problem is hard relative to G, we have:
Pr A0 n; q; g; ga;G1;G2; êð Þ ¼ að Þ 6 negl nð Þ; ð43Þ
for a negligible function negl. Combining (42) and (43), one concludes that for a negligible function negl0 ¼ k:negl
Pr PCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ 6 negl0 nð Þ: ð44Þ
Corollary 2. For any outsourced blinded dataset to the CSP, no party even the CA can recover an element of the corresponding
dataset.
Proof. Consider an adversary B possessing a secret-key set of data users SKB in an AB-PSI system. Let
P ¼ Setup;KeyGen;Blind;TokenGen1;TokenGen2;PSIð Þ be an AB-PSI scheme, X ¼ xi
 k
i¼1 be a dataset such that B does
not have any information about its elements, and BDTX be a blinded dataset corresponding to X
. Let us consider the following
three cases:
1. B models the CSP that colludes with a group of unauthorized data users.
2. B models an authorized data user.
3. B models the CA.




denotes the event that B recovers an element of X. In the following, we show that, in all the




is a negligible function of the security parameter of the system.
According to Theorem 2, in the first case, B even is not able to distinguish between BDTX and another arbitrary blinded





is negligible. Indeed, if A is the PPT adversary in PCA;P nð Þ experiment, it can query for any secret-





6 Pr PCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1ð Þ: ð45Þ




is a negligible function.
Now, assume that B models the CA. In this case, it must have the master secret-key of the system. So, it cannot be com-
pared with adversaries in AC DAA;P nð Þ or PCA;P nð Þ experiments. So, we have to consider another experiment denoted byfPCA;P nð Þ as follows:
1. Setup: The challenger selects a security parameter n and the universal attribute set U. Then, it runs
PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
and returns PK;MSKð Þ to the adversary A.
2. Challenge: Adversary A returns a non-trivial access policy T  to the challenger. The challenger selects a dataset
X ¼ xi
 
i2I , where x

i  Zq, for any i 2 I
. Then, it runs BDT

x
if gi2I  Blind PK; T
;Xð Þ and returns BDT

x
if gi2I to A.
3. Guess: A outputs a plaintext x.
The output of the experiment is defined to be 1 if x 2 xi
 
i2I , and 0 otherwise. We write fPCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1 when the output of the
experiment is 1, and we say the adversary succeeds.
The only difference between PCA;P nð Þ and fPCA;P nð Þ is that in fPCA;P nð Þ the master secret-key of the system is given to A
instead of the oracleOKeyGen Att; iduð Þ. Note that, in fPCA;P nð Þ, the adversary determines the access control policy of the blinded









6 Pr fPCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1 : ð46Þ
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In the following, we show that, under the hardness assumption of DL problem, Pr fPCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1  is a negligible function of n
which proves this corollary. Let A0 and n; q;G1;G2; ê; g; gað Þ be the same as in the proof of Theorem 3, and let A be an adver-
sary in fPCA;P nð Þ experiment. Suppose that A0 runs A as a subroutine as follows:
 A0 provide A with PK;MSKð Þ by running Setup 1n;U
 
algorithm.






corresponding to aX ¼ axi
 k
i¼1 which is gen-
erated in the same way as in the proof of Theorem 3.
 Adversary A returns an element ~x 2 Zq to A0.
By a similar argument to that in the proof of Theorem 3, we can see that
Pr A0 n; q; g; ga;G1;G2; êð Þ ¼ að ÞP
1
k
Pr fPCA;P nð Þ ¼ 1 : ð47Þ




is a negligible function.
Corollary 3. In contrast with some existing IBE and ABE schemes, AB-PSI scheme does not suffer from key escrow problem. Indeed,
assuming the CA is a semi-trusted entity that is curious to learn the elements of outsourced datasets, one can see that the scheme is
still secure.
Proof. As shown in Corollary 2, the CA cannot learn any information about the contents of data associated with blinded
datasets. So, the proof is straightforward.
7. Characteristics and performance analysis
In this section, we first compare the characteristics of AB-PSI scheme with some current cloud-based PSI schemes. Then,
we evaluate the efficiency of AB-PSI construction, including time execution, storage cost, and communication overhead, in
terms of both asymptotic complexity and actual implementation of the proposed system. The notations used in this section
are described in Table 3.
Notice that to make a fair comparison, we give up comparing the execution time and storage cost of AB-PSI scheme with
the other works. The reason is that AB-PSI and current PSI protocols are fundamentally different in terms of underlying prim-
itives and designed goals. However, our implementation result shows that AB-PSI is quite efficient and applicable.
We implemented AB-PSI scheme on an Ubuntu 18.04 laptop with an Intel Core i5-2410M Processor 2.3 GHz, 6 GB RAM
using Python and python Pairing-Based Cryptography (pyPBC) library [39]. In our implementation, we used a 64-bit hash
function and the bilinear map with Type A pairing (l ¼ 512) providing a level of security equivalent to 1024-bit discrete log-
arithm problem. Also, we assume that the access control policies are in the form of a1 AND . . .AND aNð Þ, where N is the num-
ber of attributes in the access policy, and ai is an attribute, 1 6 i 6 N. Indeed, according to the notations given in Table 3, we
have N ¼ jLT j ¼ jSj.
7.1. Characteristics analysis
In this section, we evaluate AB-PSI scheme by comparing its features with the other cloud-based PSI schemes. The sum-
mary of the comparison results is given in Table 4.
Since the CSP is assumed to be honest but curious, protecting the privacy of outsourced data is more critical when some
parts of the PSI computation are delegated to the CSP. In schemes presented in [25,35,42], the CSP can learn whether or not
the intersection of two datasets is non-empty. While, in AB-PSI and [1,21–23], the CSP does not gain any information about
the result of the protocol.
In a cloud-based PSI protocol, it is expected that the CSP cannot compute on outsourced datasets. However, in schemes
[25,42], the CSP can compute the intersection of the outsourced datasets without the permission of data owners. This prob-
lem has been resolved in AB-PSI and [1,21–23,35].
Because the CSP is assumed to be semi-trusted, to obtain some unauthorized information about the outsourced datasets,
it is reasonable that it colludes with some malicious data users. However, the schemes presented in [1,21,25] are vulnerable
to the collusion attack. Indeed, in these schemes, any unauthorized data user colliding with the CSP can compute the inter-
section of its dataset with any outsourced dataset to the CSP. However, in AB-PSI and [22,23,35,42], colluding the CSP with
data users does not threaten the security of the schemes.
Among the mentioned PSI schemes, the only ones providing multi PSI computation without needing to re-prepare the
outsourced datasets are AB-PSI and [1]. In these schemes, clients generate tokens corresponding to their datasets, and the
created tokens can be used whenever they want to run the PSI protocol. However, in the other schemes, clients have to
re-prepare their tokens after each intersection computation.
M. Ali et al. / Information Sciences 536 (2020) 222–243 237
In AB-PSI, the intersection computation can be done without the participation of data owners, so they can be offline after
outsourcing their datasets to the CSP. However, in [1,21–23,25,35,42], both of the clients should be online and have inter-
action with each other.
Finally, AB-PSI is the only scheme providing fine-grained access control over the outsourced encrypted datasets. In AB-
PSI, by defining an access control policy, a data owner with a dataset X can determine authorized data users to compute
the intersection between their datasets and X. However, in schemes [1,21–23,25,35,42], clients cannot specify the authorized
users before outsourcing their datasets, and they have to grant online permissions for intersection computation.
7.2. Execution-time overhead
In the following subsection, we analyze the execution-time overhead of AB-PSI scheme. We present our results in terms of
the asymptotic complexity and execution time of the implemented algorithms.
Table 5 presents the execution-time overhead on the entities of the system. The asymptotic results are measured in terms
of: Bilinear pairing operation, hash operation, exponentiation operation, and group operation.
7.2.1. Execution-time overhead on the CA
FromTable 5, the execution timeof Setup andKeyGen algorithmsare functions of the cardinalities of the universal attribute
set, jUj, and the data user’s attribute set, jAttj, respectively. By implementing these two algorithms,we computed their running
time when jUj and jAttj are ranged between 10 and 50. The obtained performance graphs are given in Fig. 8(a) and (b).
Table 3
Notation used in our numerical comparison.
Notation Description
jUj Cardinality of the universal attribute set of the system
jAttj Cardinality of a data user’s attribute set
jLT j Cardinality of the leaf node set of an access tree T
jSj Cardinality of the minimal attribute set satisfying the access tree
jY j Cardinality of the data user’s dataset
jXj Cardinality of the data owner’s dataset
Te1 Exponentiation operation time in G1
Te2 Exponentiation operation time in G2
TP Pairing operation time
To1 Time of the group operation in G1
To2 Time of the group operation in G2
TH Hash operation time
TI jXj;jY jð Þ Time needed to compute the intersection between two datasets with cardinalities jXj and jY j
lG1 Bit length of an element in G1
lG2 Bit length of an element in G2
lH Bit length of an output of H
lZq Bit length of an element in Zq
Table 4
Comparison of caractristics.
Features AB-PSI [22] [23] [25] [42] [21] [35] [1]
Private against the CSP U U U   U  U
PSI computation authorization U U U   U U U
Secure against collusion of cloud and data users U U U  U  U 
Supporting one-to-many communication without needing to re-prepare U       U
None interactive with offline data owners U       
Fine-grained access control U       
Table 5
Computation time overhead.
Algorithm Running time Executor
Setup jUj þ 3ð ÞTe1 þ 3Tp þ To1 CA
KeyGen 1þ jAttjð Þ Te1 þ To1
 
CA
Blind 1þ 2jLTð ÞjTe1 þ jXj þ 1ð ÞTe2 +jXjTH þ jLT jTo1 Data owner
TokenGen1 5Te1 þ Te2 þ jAttjTo1 Data user
TokenGen2 jSjTe2 þ 4jSj þ 4ð ÞTp þ 2jSj þ 1ð ÞTo1 þ 5jSj þ 3ð ÞTo2 CSP
PSI jY j Te2 þ TH
 
þ To2 þ TI jXj;jY jð Þ Data user
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7.2.2. Execution-time overhead on data owners
As we presented in Table 5, the execution time of Blind algorithm depends on the data owner’s dataset cardinality, jXj,
and the number of leaf nodes in the access tree, jLT j. To observe variations of the running time, we implement Blind algo-
rithm for jXj 2 25;26; . . . ;220
n o
and jLT j 2 10;20; . . . ;50f g. The obtained results are given in Fig. 8(c).
As we can see in this figure, when 25 6 jXj 6 210, the execution time of the algorithm is less than one second. Also, the
execution time is satisfactory when the dataset cardinality is very large. For example, when jXj ¼ 218; jXj ¼ 219, and
jXj ¼ 220, the execution times are not more than 121;250, and 495 seconds, respectively. Also, we observed that the execu-
tion time grows slowly by increasing the number of leaf nodes. In fact, it grows 0.1 s when the number of leaf nodes
increased by 10.
7.2.3. Execution-time overhead on data users
From Table 5, the running time of TokenGen1 algorithm depends on the number of the data user’s attributes. Also, the
execution-time of PSI algorithm is affected by the data user’s dataset cardinality, jY j, and data owner’s dataset cardinality,
jXj. We executed these two algorithm when jAttj 2 10;20; . . . ;50f g and jXj; jY j 2 25;210;215;220
n o
. The execution-time of
TokenGen1 and PSI algorithms are illustrated in parts (d) and (e) of Fig. 8, respectively.
7.2.4. Execution-time overhead on the CSP
According to Table 5, the execution-time of TokenGen2 algorithm is a function of the data user’s minimal attribute set
satisfying the access tree, jSj. Fig. 8(f) presents the execution-time of this algorithm when jSj is ranged between 10 and 50.
7.3. Storage overhead
In this subsection, we analyze the storage overhead of our AB-PSI system. We evaluate storage cost on the CSP for storing
outsourced blinded datasets and storage cost on data users for maintaining their secret-keys and their datasets. We do not
consider the storage cost on data owners for maintaining their datasets, because they can become offline after outsourcing
their dataset forever, so they do not need their dataset for running the algorithm of the system.
In the following, we present our asymptotic complexity and implementation results.
Fig. 8. Execution-time overhead on: (a) CA for running Setup algorithm; (b) CA for running KeyGen algorithm; (c) data owners in Dataset Blinding phase;
(d) data users for running TokenGen1 algorithm; (e) data users for running PSI algorithm; (f) the CSP for running TokenGen2 algorithm.
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7.3.1. Storage overhead on the CSP
The storage complexity on the CSP is demonstrated in Table 6. As the table shows, it grows linearly with the cardinality of
the data owner’s dataset, jXj, and the number of leaf nodes in the access tree, jLT j. By implementing Blind algorithm, we eval-
uate the storage cost when jXj 2 25;26; . . . ;220
n o
and jLT j 2 10;20; . . . ;50f g. Fig. 9(a) presents the resulted performance
graph.
One can see that the storage cost is low even for high dataset cardinality. Indeed, from Fig. 9(a), the volume of a blinded
dataset is less than 1 MB when jXj  216, and the volume is not more than 10 MB when jXj ¼ 220.
7.3.2. Storage overhead on data users
Table 6 demonstrates the storage overhead on data users. The storage costs are due to storing their secret-keys and their
datasets. As we see in the table, the length of the secret-keys depends on the number of data users’ attributes. Also, in our
scheme, any data user should map each element in their dataset to an element in Zq and save it for running the PSI and
TokenGen1 algorithms. So, jY jlZq -bit memories are needed for the storage.
Fig. 9 reveals the implementation results. In part (b) of the figure, we evaluated the size of a data user’s secret-key when
the number of its attributes is ranged between 10 and 50. Also, part (c) presents the storage cost on a data user for main-
taining its dataset when the dataset cardinality is ranged between 25 and 220.
7.4. Communication overhead
In this subsection, we discuss the theoretical and experimental results of the communication overhead in AB-PSI system
that is mainly incurred by transmitting the secret-keys, blinded datasets, and PSI tokens. Specifically, we calculate the com-
munication overhead in terms of the size of secret-keys transmitted by the CA to a data user, size of blinded dataset out-
Table 6
Storage overhead.
Stored data Size Stored by
blinded dataset lG2 þ 2jLT j þ 1ð ÞlG1 þ jXjlH CSP
Secret-key jAttjlG1 Data user
Dataset jY jlZq Data user
Fig. 9. Storage overhead on: (a) the CSP for maintaining a blinded dataset ; (b) data users for storing their datasets; (c) data users for keeping their secret-
keys.
Table 7
Communication overhead in ordinary executions.
Communication overhead from Size Algorithm
CA to data user jAttjlG1 KeyGen
Data owner to CSP lG2 þ 2jLT j þ 1ð ÞlG1 þ jXjlH Blind
Data user to CSP jAttj þ 4ð ÞlG1 þ lG2 TokenGen1
CSP to data user lG2 þ jXjlH TokenGen2
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sourced to the CSP by a data owner, size of a PSI token generated by TokenGen1 algorithm and sent to the CSP by a data user,
and size of the output of TokenGen2 algorithm transmitted from the CSP to a data user.
For secret-keys and blinded datasets, the results on the storage and communication overhead are the same. Therefore,
since in the last subsection, we analyzed the storage overhead of secret-keys and blinded dataset, here we only consider
the communication overhead caused by transmitting the PSI tokens.
From Table 7, the communication overhead caused by transmitting the output of TokenGen1 algorithm is a function of
the data user’s attribute set cardinality, jAttj. We evaluated the communication overhead when jAttj is ranged in 10 50. The
implementation results are given in Fig. 10(a).
Also, from the table, the communication cost caused by transmitting the output of TokenGen2 from the CSP to a data user
depends on the cardinality of the underlying dataset, jXj. In Fig. 10(b), we computed the size of the transmitted data when jXj
is ranged between 25 and 220.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, we designed the first fine-grained access control system for the private set intersection (PSI) computation in
cloud computing. The scheme achieves the following advantages: i) Data owners can control intersection computation on
their datasets by defining an access control policy. ii) The scheme is not interactive, and data owners can be offline during
the PSI protocol. iii) It supports one-to-many communication. Indeed, In our scheme, blinded outsourced datasets to the
cloud can be used in PSI computations for arbitrary times. Also, we provided security definitions for the AB-PSI scheme,
and we formally proved its security in the standard model. We also demonstrated the utility of AB-PSI scheme by evaluating
its performance. Security analyses and performance evaluations indicated that the new tool is efficient and practical.
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Appendix A. Appendix. Correctness proof
Theorem 1: If H is a collision resistant hash function, then AB-PSI scheme is correct.
Proof. Consider two datasets X ¼ xif gi2I and Y ¼ yj
n o
j2J
, PK;MSKð Þ  Setup 1n;U
 
, an access tree T satisfied by an attribute
set Att, SK uð ÞAtt  KeyGen PK;MSK;Att; iduð Þ, BD
T
X  Blind PK; T ;Xð Þ; TK
uð Þ











. In the following, we first prove Eqs. (14) and (16). Then, we conclude
PSI PK; TK uð ÞX ;Y ;d
 
¼ X \ Y ð48Þ
provided the hash function H is a collision resistant hash function. We have:
Fig. 10. Communication cost from: (a) Data users to the CSP; (b) The CSP to a data user.
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C2 :ê h
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Thus, Eq. (16) is correct. Also, the correctness of Eq. (18) can easily be checked. On the other hands, for any two elements
x; y 2 Zq, we have x ¼ y if and only if hx3 ¼ h
y
3. Therefore, by the assumption that H is a collision-resistant hash function,
we have
ykf gk2K ¼ xif gi2I \ yj
 
j2J ;
where K ¼ k 2 JjH hryk3
 
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